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i 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE'S MOOTNESS ARGUMENT DOES NOT APPLY 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION TO 
RESENTENCE MR. ANGELOS-
The State argues that the constitutional right-to-counsel 
issue is moot because the trial court resentenced Mr. Angelos, 
with counsel, on November 13, 2 001. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 6-
9. However, for the reasons specified below, the State's mootness 
argument is inapplicable because the trial court was without 
jurisdiction to resentence Mr. Angelos while the case was pending 
on appeal.1 
According to well-established Utah law, the general rule is 
that "the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over a case 
while it is under advisement on appeal." Hi-Country Estates 
Homeowners Assoc, v. Foothills Water Co., 942 P.2 305, 306 (Utah 
1996). "An appeal divests the trial court of jurisdiction and 
transfers it to the appellate court, where it remains until the 
trial court regains jurisdiction." Id.-, White v. State, 795 P. 2d 
648, 650 (Utah 1990). 
xEven if this Court considered mootness to be an issue, which is 
precluded by the trial court's lack of jurisdiction, the public-
interest exception would apply because the denial of the 
constitutional right to counsel in the midst of drug court 
proceedings affects the public interest and is likely to recur yet 
evade appellate review. See State v. Sims, 881 P. 2d 840, 841-42 
(Utah 1994) (citations omitted); State v. Martinez, 925 P.2d 176, 
177-78 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896, 
899 (Utah 1981)). 
4 
This case demonstrates the underlying policy reasons for the 
rule prohibiting the trial court from exercising jurisdiction in 
a case while it is pending on appeal. The trial court, well after 
the filing of the Notice of Appeal on June 14, 2001, resentenced 
Mr. Angelos on November 13, 2 001 (See R. 131-32). At that 
hearing, the trial court apparently granted Mr. Angelos the right 
to be represented by counsel (See id.). By resentencing Mr. 
Angelos, the trial court modified the same sentence pending before 
this Court on appeal and thereby presented "the proverbial 'moving 
target' the rule was designed to prevent." See Hi-Country 
Estates, 942 P.2d at 307; see also White, 795 P.2d at 649 & n.2 
(citing Long v. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 646 F.2d 1310, 1318 
(9th Cir. 1981)) .2 
Consequently, the resentencing on 11/13/01 was void because 
the trial court had no jurisdiction to resentence Mr. Angelos 
while the case was still pending before the appellate court. In 
light of the State's concession that sentencing is a critical 
stage in the criminal proceeding, and that Mr. Angelos was 
2In addition to preventing the uncontrollable moving target of 
multiple judgments, the aforementioned rule that divests a trial 
court of jurisdiction while the case is pending on appeal preserves 
the integrity of the judicial system and the manner in which it is 
intended to operate with respect to appellate review. 
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unrepresented at sentencing on May 15, 2 001,3 the logical 
conclusion is that Mr. Angelos was denied his constitutional right 
to counsel. Therefore, the Court should vacate both the 
convictions and sentence of Mr. Angelos and remand the case to the 
trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROVIDED MR. ANGELOS WITH NEITHER 
THE REQUISITE NOTICE AND AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE 
HEARD NOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING PRIOR TO 
SUMMARILY IMPOSING SENTENCE. 
The State argues that the trial court provided Mr. Angelos 
with adequate notice prior to terminating his plea in abeyance 
agreement. See Brief of Appellee, pp. 10-13. A closer review of 
the record, however, indicates otherwise. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l) (1999) provides, in relevant 
part, as follows: 
If, at any time during the term of the 
plea in abeyance agreement, information comes 
to the attention of the prosecuting attorney 
or the court that the defendant has violated 
any condition of the agreement, the court . . 
. may issue an order requiring the defendant 
to appear before the court at a designated 
time and place to show cause why the court 
should not find the terms of the agreement to 
have been violated and why the agreement 
should not be terminated. If, following an 
evidentiary hearing, the court finds that the 
defendant has failed to substantially comply 
with any term or condition of the plea in 
3The State's concessions are set forth at page 6 of the Brief of 
Appellee. 
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abeyance agreement, it may terminate the 
agreement and enter judgment of conviction 
and impose sentence against the defendant for 
the offense to which the original plea was 
entered. . . . 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the arrest warrant issued 
by the trial court on April 24, 2001, failed to provide any notice 
that the court, at the next hearing, would require Mr. Angelos to 
"show cause why the court should not find the terms of the 
agreement to have been violated and why the agreement should not 
be terminated." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4 (1) (1999). Rather, 
the warrant, according to its own terms, merely provided notice 
that a warrant, in fact, had been issued for the failure to 
appear. Consequently, the trial court failed to even provide the 
notice contemplated by § 77-2a-4 not to mention that which is 
constitutionally required by constitution, both federal and state. 
See U.S. Const, amend V and Utah Const, art. I, § 7; see also 
Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990); State v. Rawlings, 
892 P.2d 1063, 1069 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In the course of its argument, the State mistakenly refers to 
the hearing held on May 8, 2001, as an "evidentiary hearing." The 
hearing held on May 8, 2001, fails to even resemble an evidentiary 
hearing. No evidence was taken by the trial court by means of 
witnesses, records, documents, exhibits, or otherwise for the 
purpose to induce findings or belief by the trial court. Instead 
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the transcript of the 5/8/01 hearing merely demonstrates a 
discussion between the trial court and Mr. Angelos concerning the 
court's disappointment (See R. 155). 
By depriving Mr. Angelos of his rights to due process, the 
district court adversely affected his substantial and fundamental 
rights to notice and opportunity to adequately meet the 
allegations concerning violations of the drug court agreement. 
Although the district court knew that it would consider the 
termination of the agreement at the 5/8/01 hearing, it proceeded 
without providing Mr. Angelos with the requisite due process 
safeguards.4 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, as well as that set forth in the 
Brief of Appellant, Mr. Angelos respectfully requests that this 
Court vacate both his convictions and sentence, and that the Court 
remand the case for further proceedings consistent with the 
instructions in its Opinion, and for such other relief as the 
4Not only did the district court deprive Mr. Angelos of his 
rights to due process, it breached the express terms of the Plea in 
Abeyance Agreement by refusing to provide Mr. Angelos with, among 
other things, an evidentiary hearing prior to imposing sentence (See 
R. 51-52, Plea in Abeyance Agreement and Order, %9) . 
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Court deems just and appropriate under the circumstances of this 
case, 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 4th day of February, 2003 
WIGGINS, P.C. 
/ 
Attorney 
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ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 24(a)(11). 
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